

LESSONS LEARNED FOR THE OSCE FROM ITS ENGAGEMENT IN UKRAINE



Interim Report and Recommendations
of the Panel of Eminent Persons on
European Security as a Common Project

June 2015

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Foreword

The Panel of Eminent Persons is “designed to provide advice on how to re-consolidate European security as a common project,” as the OSCE Troika mandate puts it. Our panel debates and research trips during the past few months have demonstrated both how important and how difficult this work is.

The Panel is tasked by the Troika to produce two reports: an Interim Report, in particular on lessons learned for the OSCE from its engagement in Ukraine, and a Final Report – at the end of 2015 – on the broader issues of security in Europe and in the wider OSCE area.

The Interim Report lays out five major lessons and recommends steps that we believe would help the OSCE work more effectively and more efficiently. The report deliberately focuses on operational questions, leaving the bigger political questions for the Final Report.

That said, and this is particularly true of the OSCE, many operational questions are eminently political – as we have been reminded in the course of our panel debates. The recommendations are therefore often modest and are not always original – and in some few cases not every member of the Panel was able to fully endorse them. That does not make them less important. Moving international cooperation forward is always a slow process and every effort counts.

Our debates in the Panel were often intense, about facts as well as about policies. Western and Russian narratives on the question of foreign troops and weapons in Ukraine, or on the sequence of events leading up to the annexation of Crimea and the military escalation in eastern Ukraine are very different. This is one reason why we dropped the chronology that had originally been annexed to this report. And this is why we agreed that individual members of the Panel would be able to register their personal views on specific issues in footnotes.

For all the disagreements during the panel debates, I believe I speak for the whole Panel when I say that the

OSCE has performed remarkably since the beginning of the Ukraine crisis. Over the course of the crisis, the OSCE, which had been neglected for a decade or more, has been asked to fulfill numerous tasks that it never had to tackle before, and has had to do so with limited resources and under circumstances on the ground that were subject to constant and often dramatic change.

The crisis has brought us face to face with the indivisibility of security in Europe, and has reminded us of the inter-linkage of the three OSCE Dimensions: the political, the economic and the human dimension. The OSCE itself remains vital as a forum for dialogue and political process – and, in times of crisis, as a vehicle for collective action. These are among the themes that we will turn to in our final report.

The situation in Ukraine remains dangerous. Even the first steps of the Minsk Agreements have not been completed: we still receive frequent reports of the use of heavy weapons. We urge all parties to make full use of the OSCE to de-escalate the crisis, to intensify dialogue, and to seek lasting peace in Ukraine.

In the course of our work our appreciation for the women and men working for the OSCE – both in Vienna and in the field – has constantly grown. They deserve our respect; and they also deserve that decision-makers give serious consideration to the recommendations that we put forward here.

Finally, let me explicitly state that the responsibility for any misunderstandings and errors that may have occurred during the drafting and editing process are mine and mine alone, and I stand ready to accept full responsibility for any possible omissions or misrepresentations of panelists’ views.



Amb. Wolfgang Ischinger

Chairperson of the Panel of Eminent Persons
on European Security as a Common Project

Executive Summary

The Report draws five lessons from the OSCE's engagement with Ukraine:

In spite of the difficulty of moving from early warning to early action, the OSCE should regard conflict prevention as a key task and should empower the Secretary General accordingly.

Leadership is essential: it would be desirable to develop the Troika system and to strengthen the position of the Secretary General.

The need for the OSCE to acquire a legal personality is clear: the Report draws attention to on-going work that may offer a way forward.

The link between the political and the operational is a key to effectiveness: the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine on its own is not enough; but its knowledge and capacity – including the ability to deal with bodies whose status is disputed – should be used to the full in the search for de-escalation and reconciliation.

Finally, the Report suggests some modest steps, complementing those that the Secretary General is working on, to strengthen capacity in the Secretariat/Conflict Prevention Centre, both directly and through international partnerships.



OSCE SMM Monitors at the crash site of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 in eastern Ukraine, July 2014.

This Report, the first of two mandated by the 2015 OSCE Troika – Switzerland, Serbia and Germany – to look at European security as a common project, considers lessons to be learned from the OSCE’s engagement with Ukraine in 2014 and 2015. This Interim Report focuses primarily on operational questions.

Many of the issues raised in this Report are the outward signs of a deeper crisis in Europe. This stems from the erosion of the consensus in Europe on how security and cooperation should be realized. The contradictory perceptions of events among the OSCE participating States have undermined the idea of the indivisibility of security. The results of this have been reflected throughout the crisis in and around Ukraine: in the challenges of prevention, in the difficulties of reaching agreements to de-escalate the conflict, and in the problems of implementing agreements when they are reached. The lack of consensus is also reflected in the weakness of the OSCE as an organization – of which the lack of a legal personality is a particularly damaging example. It is for this reason that the Report underlines the importance of political leadership. The Panel’s own inability to reach a consensus on all its recommendations is another reflection of the same underlying problem. The Panel will explore these questions in its Final Report.

The Panel wishes to record its respect and appreciation for the commitment and skill of the OSCE leadership and staff who, in spite of the built-in handicaps of the Organization – some of which are discussed below – have done a remarkable job in this crisis.

The OSCE's Role in Responding to the Crisis

At the beginning of the 21st century, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) seemed to be in crisis: its usefulness and relevance were widely questioned; its budget had been reduced in real terms and its Ministerial Council had failed to agree on a communiqué for more than a decade. This changed in 2014 with the Organization's response to the crisis in and around Ukraine. Ironically, the OSCE owes its renewed relevance to violations of some of its most important principles. The Panel unanimously expresses its profound regret at all such violations. The OSCE nevertheless became a key forum for negotiation, it mobilized a monitoring mission of up to 500 monitors at short notice in a hostile environment, and its Institutions have played a key role in highlighting human rights abuses. The crisis in and around Ukraine has brought the OSCE back into focus – demonstrating its added value, but also exposing its limitations.

The OSCE has been present in Ukraine since 1994, including in Crimea until 1999, initially through the OSCE Mission to Ukraine (1994-1999), and later the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine (PCU). The PCU has a limited mandate, not permitting it to report on the growing political crisis in Ukraine – which was nonetheless obvious to most observers.

Both the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) and the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media (RFoM) have been frequent visitors to Ukraine. The High Commissioner provided advice on language issues and drew attention, inter alia, to the situation of the Crimean Tatars. The Representative on Freedom of the Media warned publicly of the deteriorating situation as numerous journalists were attacked while reporting on incidents in Kyiv in November 2013.¹

The Government of Ukraine under President Yanukovych was unready to acknowledge the seriousness of the problems either as OSCE Chairmanship in 2013, or on its own account, when Switzerland took over the Chairmanship in 2014.

1. "The harassment and threatening of journalists in Ukraine continues, and became especially active after the coup d'etat." – Sergei Karaganov



**OSCE SMM Monitors
visiting Shyrokyne to
assess the situation and
encourage parties to
disengage, April 2015.**

In January and February 2014, protests in Kyiv's Maidan Square became bigger and more violent. The crisis reached a peak toward the end of February with the killing of demonstrators, apparently by sniper fire, and the departure of President Yanukovich. These events took place just before the annual appearance of the OSCE Chairmanship before the United Nations Security Council, providing an opportunity for the new Chairperson-in-Office, Swiss President and Foreign Minister Didier Burkhalter, to set an agenda related to Ukraine. This included the appointment of a special envoy, the deployment of a preliminary needs assessment mission to Ukraine, as well as the creation of an international contact group. In late February the Chairmanship began consultations on the deployment of an OSCE mission to Ukraine despite widespread scepticism. The new Ukrainian government – which came to office following presidential (25 May 2014) and parliamentary elections (26 October 2014) in accordance with its constitution and which were monitored by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly – was ready to work with the Organization.

Shortly after, a sequence of events took place that culminated in the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation.² Thereafter access to Crimea was denied to representatives from different OSCE bodies and inspectors deployed under the Vienna Document.

Because of the turbulent political situation in Ukraine, allegations of human rights abuses, and a rising death toll among civilians, the Needs Assessment Mission proposed by the Chairmanship was followed by a Human Rights Assessment Mission bringing together ODIHR and the HCNM, as well as a national dialogue expert mission hosted by PCU. On 21 March, the Permanent Council decided to deploy the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

(SMM). The Chairmanship's access at head of state and government level was important in obtaining this result.

Thanks to preparatory work in the Secretariat, within 24 hours of the Permanent Council's decision, an advance team of first responders drawn from existing OSCE Field Operations was deployed in Ukraine.

As originally conceived, the SMM was to help facilitate dialogue in a divided society. But the crisis evolved rapidly during spring and summer 2014. What began with peaceful demonstrations continued with the takeover of government buildings and media outlets by men carrying sticks, then roadblocks by men armed with Kalashnikovs, leading finally to separatist groups and foreign military, with both sides in eastern Ukraine employing artillery and rockets. The tasks and organization of the SMM changed in response. With the shooting down of flight MH17, the SMM attracted wider notice as the first international organization on the scene and a vital intermediary. At the time of writing, the conflict has resulted in more than 6,400 deaths, many of them civilians, together with over 2.1 million displaced people.³

In summer 2014 the Swiss Chairmanship, together with the governments of Ukraine and the Russian Federation, established the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG). Representatives of certain areas in Luhansk and Donetsk regions⁴ have been associated with meetings of the TCG.⁵ Its work bore fruit in September 2014 in the shape of the Minsk Agreements – though not so far in their full implementation. In February 2015, the TCG agreed on a package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk Agreements. Working Groups have subsequently been set up in this framework to cover Security, Political, Humanitarian and Economic aspects of the implementation package.

2. "Of course, it was not an annexation, but the reunification of the people of Crimea with Russia, which happened peacefully and only after a referendum where the overwhelming majority voted for reunification, and in accordance with the principle of self-determination of peoples. That was an especially positive development against the background of the rupture of Kosovo from Yugoslavia after three months of bombardment of this country and even without any referendum among the people of Kosovo." – Sergei Karaganov

3. "Inevitably a short paragraph such as this is in many important respects incomplete and in part misleading." – Sergei Karaganov

4. This is the terminology of the Minsk Agreements.

5. "The representatives from Lugansk and Donetsk were not 'associated' but participated in not a 'trilateral' but an 'international' contact group." – Sergei Karaganov

Lessons to be learned

The Panel sees five broad areas where lessons can be learned from the OSCE's efforts to defuse the crisis in and around Ukraine:



OSCE SMM Monitors in eastern Ukraine, March 2015.

1

The Failure of Prevention

Reports such as this one commonly call for early warning and prevention. In theory, early warning is not difficult. Many, if not most, crises are foreseeable. Particularly where tensions arise from domestic political problems concerning minorities, long gestation periods are common. The risks of instability from structural problems such as corrupted institutions are equally likely to be visible.

Divisions in Ukrainian society had been evident for years. In such cases, however, it is difficult to know whether the resources of national politics will be able to deal with the problems, or whether the system as a whole will fail, with violence replacing politics. The normal response of governments is to rely on internal problem solving: anything else seems an admission of defeat or incompetence. It is in the nature of sovereign states to resist internationalizing domestic problems – until it is too late.

In rare cases where international organizations have persuaded governments to take early action to reduce tensions, success has been due in part to pressure from other parties.

In the case of Ukraine there do not appear to have been warnings of external intervention.

The difficulties of prevention in the Ukrainian case were therefore not exceptional. Different OSCE Institutions warned of the risks and tried to mitigate them, for example, through national dialogue; but they failed. The costs and difficulties of stopping a conflict once it has begun are always greater than those of preventing it, if this can be done. For this reason, in spite of the obstacles, prevention has to remain a key OSCE objective. In the case of Ukraine today, this applies to the work of the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG) and the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) – both of which can play a role

in de-escalating and limiting the conflict. More generally the OSCE should give the Secretary General a standing mandate to take any steps within his authority that he thinks useful in the interests of conflict prevention, where necessary acting behind the scenes and reporting to the Permanent Council after the event. It is better to try and fail than not to try at all.

The Panel calls also on others who may have influence in such situations to work with the Secretary General.

Recommendation: The OSCE should give priority to conflict prevention and should empower the Secretary General to act on its behalf in pursuit of this objective.

The Importance of Leadership

The OSCE's achievement in its reaction to the crisis owes much to the skill of the 2014 Swiss Chairmanship. It is not clear what would have happened had the Chair been less skillful or less committed to the goals of the Organization. When it comes to securing a consensus in the Permanent Council there is no substitute for political leadership by the Chair. Having an effective Chair is therefore of great importance for the OSCE. The following approaches are worth pursuing:

- ▶ Develop the Troika as a system for continuity and mutual support. Work consciously to achieve Troikas that bring together a balance of experience and competences and that can work as teams.
- ▶ Ensure (multi-year) continuity of joint work programmes and Special Representatives in crucial positions.
- ▶ Follow the practice of drawing on a wide pool of talent for Special Representatives, Chairs of working groups etc.
- ▶ Encourage countries which through their national position and traditions are particularly apt for the job not to wait twenty years before doing it again.
- ▶ In 2014, the Chairperson-in-Office was also Head of State. This strengthened his leadership role. Future Chairpersons should have the active support of their Head of State or Government, as well as political support from other participating States.
- ▶ The “Normandy Group” is not part of the OSCE machinery but it includes some of the most relevant actors and its work has contributed to OSCE objectives. As suggested below, if its role continues, it will be important to strengthen its links to the OSCE.

The Secretary General is also to be congratulated on his work. A stronger Secretary General would mean a stronger OSCE, and better support for the Chairmanship. The division of labour with the Chairmanship should be clarified, particularly in relation to the launch of the OSCE Field Operations. In this event, political questions – for example on the mandate – are for the Chairmanship to negotiate, with the Secretary General's advice; administrative and operational questions and day-to-day management should be for the Secretary General.⁶

- ▶ Since Field Operations are likely to outlast the term of office of the Chairmanship, the Secretary General should, in consultation with the Chair, have the power to appoint and dismiss Heads of Field Operations; and they should report to the Secretary General/Conflict Prevention Centre.
- ▶ Given the desirability of early preventive action by the Secretary General, he or she should have access to a small contingency fund for such purposes, without prior authorization from the Permanent Council.

Recommendation: The OSCE should try to ensure that it always has a capable Chairmanship/Troika, and should strengthen the ability of the Secretary General to take action in the interests of enabling the Organization both to prevent conflicts and to respond rapidly and effectively in a crisis.

6. “In principle I share the logic of possibly eventually giving the Secretary General and Secretariat somewhat more powers in crises. However, under the circumstances of current acute political and informational confrontation, which reminds us of the worst days of the Cold War, the diffusion of powers of participating states is dangerous. The Secretary General could fall prey to prejudices or blackmail. So for the time being I am strongly against giving the Secretary General any additional authorities and powers including the right to appoint heads of field missions and the creation of a special fund for use by the will of the Secretary General. When we in Europe and the Euroatlantic community return to more civilized political, diplomatic and informational behavior the issue could be revisited.” – Sergei Karaganov

The Need for a Legal Personality

One of the most visible weaknesses of the OSCE is the lack of a recognized legal personality. The Ukraine crisis illustrates the damaging practical consequences of this.

In 2014, except for the Office of the Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine (PCU), the OSCE had no legal status in Ukraine. Therefore, it had to negotiate a Memorandum of Understanding for the deployment of the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM). Negotiation and ratification were completed in just seven weeks. Meanwhile the SMM operated with almost no legal status: SMM monitors had none of the privileges or immunities required for the fulfilment of their functions, nor security guarantees from the host state. The OSCE did not therefore exercise its duty of care as an employer, and was potentially liable for any damages suffered by its monitors. The dangers of this situation were exposed when, before the Memorandum of Understanding was ratified, eight monitors were abducted and held incommunicado for several weeks. Nor, during the same period, was the SMM able to open bank accounts, enter into contracts, issue vehicle number plates or import equipment – some of it vital for security. And while the Memorandum now protects SMM staff, other OSCE staff travelling to Ukraine have no official status, privileges, immunities or security guarantees there.

A draft “Convention on the International Legal Personality, Legal Capacity, and Privileges and Immunities of the OSCE” was agreed at expert level in 2007. It has never been adopted by the participating States, who are thus imposing collectively on the OSCE conditions which none of them would accept individually.

Work in this area has been pursued with admirable persistence, most recently in the Informal Working Group, which has come up with a number of possible ways forward. All of these merit consideration. If a consensus cannot be obtained on any of the others, the proposal that participating States wishing to do so should sign and ratify the 2007 draft Convention and deposit it with the OSCE Secretariat, applying it as a multilateral agreement among those adopting it, might serve as a fall-back position.⁷

Recommendation: The OSCE owes it to all of its staff to resolve the question of its legal personality. The work of the Informal Working Group offers a way forward.

7. “I am in favour of a legal personality for the OSCE, but believe that this should be realised when the OSCE’s existing commitments are codified in a Charter.”
– Sergei Karaganov

The Primacy of Politics

Recognition for the work of the 2014 Swiss Chairmanship has focussed on the successful launch of the Special Monitoring Mission (SMM); but a mission of this kind is only as good as the strategy it is implementing. The initiative of the Chairmanship in creating the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG) is as significant as in the case of the SMM. This has enabled the negotiating process leading to the Minsk Agreements – subsequently taken forward by the Normandy Group.

This already constitutes a lesson in itself: an operation designed to build or keep peace should be backed by a political strategy. Reciprocally, political work should be informed by operational realities on the ground. This is a method that should be retained as best practice, or as an operational doctrine.

The further step of creating the Working Groups under the TCG has the potential to build peace in concrete ways through the security and political aspects of the Minsk agenda, and also by developing security in the other OSCE Dimensions: humanitarian activities; in the framework of the human dimension; and economic exchanges. Economic rehabilitation, including joint projects and other confidence-building measures that respect traditional patterns of business activity rather than newly imposed lines, will help heal divisions. This work could offer the SMM and Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine (PCU) opportunities to engage local communities. In this context it would be helpful if the SMM could have access to financial support for its efforts to engage local communities with small projects. This could take the form of a trust fund under the authority of the Chief Monitor. For humanitarian work it would make sense for the SMM to work with national and international agencies.

If this work were to go forward, it could offer an opportunity for the SMM to support a wider process of de-escalation. As soon as security conditions allow, it would be desirable for the SMM to monitor key locations on a 24/7

basis. The ultimate objective of this should be a comprehensive reconciliation process at all levels.

An important element in the TCG has been the involvement, on an informal basis, of representatives of certain areas in Luhansk and Donetsk regions.⁸ Whether their role proves permanent or temporary, it is right that their views are heard in the negotiating process. The OSCE is well placed for this. The OSCE is not a state and the question of recognition therefore does not arise. This practice should be accepted as part of standard OSCE procedure.

The other side of the coin from these political successes is the failure so far to implement the Minsk Agreements in full despite the high level at which they have sometimes been agreed. This question goes beyond the scope of this Interim Report. The Panel would, however, underline that there is little point in increasing the size of the SMM if it does not have the security and access needed to do its job. The OSCE should be cautious about expanding the Mission unless it is given better political support.

One possible remedy might be for the Normandy Group agreements to state not only what should be monitored but also how it should be monitored. For example, the instruction to monitor the withdrawal of heavy weapons might go into more detail, specifying the type of information that parties will provide to the OSCE, including the location of weapons and the route of their withdrawal, or the use of GPS locators. For these purposes it would be useful to strengthen the links between the Normandy Group and those responsible for monitoring and implementation.

It would be an important reassurance for all sides if the international border were monitored properly. A well-resourced border monitoring mission with adequate access and security would be a useful confidence-building measure. The current OSCE Observer Mission at the Russian Checkpoints Gukovo and Donetsk is not a substitute for this. The solution lies in the full implementation in good

8. This is the terminology of the Minsk Agreements.

faith of the Minsk Agreements. Failing this, the Permanent Council should at some stage reconsider the future of this operation.

Truth is the first casualty of war. A core role of the SMM is the provision of objective, verified information – an important step in the direction of restoring trust and normality. The SMM, and the Chairmanship as issuing authority, have a responsibility to give the most complete picture possible, including through use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and satellite imagery where this can be arranged. The SMM’s reports enjoy respect and authority; if it had the access and security to enable it to monitor hot spots 24/7, these reports would be even more useful. There may also be occasions when the SMM could work with the United Nations – which reports on human rights violations – as well as reporting itself on breaches of international humanitarian law.

Recommendation: The purpose of most OSCE Field Operations is to support an active political strategy to end conflict, and they should be organized accordingly. The Panel would like to see the SMM’s work, supported with appropriate resources, move in the direction of de-escalation and reconciliation. The OSCE’s ability to engage with people and bodies whose status is disputed without prejudice to the position of participating States should be recognized.

Capacity and Cooperation

The OSCE has done a remarkable job in mounting and sustaining the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM). It has already incorporated many lessons in the organization of the Mission, and is conducting a thorough examination of its procedures. There is no need to duplicate this work here. The Panel would, however, draw attention to some points that may go beyond the scope of an internal review. An operation of the size and complexity of the SMM will not be sustainable without strengthening the operational and planning capability of the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC):

Planning

Planning capacity is at the heart of operational capability. This is essential not only for contingency planning and preparation, but also to enable augmentation in a thought-out way when an operation is underway. There is no substitute for a small core of staff in the CPC with experience in the disciplines of military planning; these skills are also important for civilian operations.

Military skills

The OSCE has recognized the value of military skills in its Field Operations and Headquarters. It should not exclude the possibility of recruiting serving military personnel on secondment where this can be done without jeopardizing the civilian character of OSCE Field Operations.

Budgetary resources

The Secretary General launched the SMM in a timely fashion by deploying first responders drawn from other OSCE Field Operations (thanks to a newly instituted roster system – which we commend). It would be sensible to allow the Secretary General similar flexibility to redeploy funds in the same way, on a temporary basis, in an emergency.

Institutional memory

The relative infrequency of large-scale OSCE Field Operations during the last 20 years, and the rules on the duration of staff contracts in the Organization, meant that few current CPC staff had experience of launching a large OSCE Field Operation. The Secretary General should have the flexibility to retain a limited number of key staff beyond the normal duration, or to allow staff to return to the Organization.

Technical means

The use of technical means has already proved vital for the SMM given the great distances and large areas it is expected to monitor. Important lessons are already being learned in this area; and the process is by no means over. The Permanent Council should consider commissioning a study to cover not only the use of technical means in the SMM but also future areas where technical means can contribute to building confidence and security. Expertise in this area should be retained in the Secretariat as well as in the SMM.

Recruitment

One question that impacts on recruitment and planning is the duration of the Field Operation: In the light of experience, it would be sensible for the Permanent Council to assume that operational missions will last at least one year and agree mandates accordingly.

Cooperative relations

The OSCE's response to the crisis in and around Ukraine demonstrates its role as a regional arrangement of the United Nations under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. There would be mutual advantage in developing this relationship further, including the possibility of integrating UN personnel into OSCE Field Operations. The OSCE should also enter into agreements with other relevant partners to draw on their assets in crisis situations, including things as diverse as technical expertise or armoured vehicles and specialized equipment.

Media

At the time of its launch, the SMM had limited media capacity; it has not succeeded in recovering from the deficit in public understanding that resulted from this. We know that the SMM and the OSCE Secretariat are aware of this and are working to remedy it. But the point is sufficiently important that it bears repeating.

Recommendation: The OSCE should strengthen its operational capability, notably through an enhanced planning capacity in Vienna, a study of the potential of technical means and stronger partnerships with other international organisations, including the United Nations.

EXEZNAN

1

Panel Members

Wolfgang Ischinger (Germany)

Chairperson primus inter pares of the Panel

Ambassador Ischinger is currently the Chairman of the Munich Security Conference. Before this appointment, he served as Ambassador to the United Kingdom (2006-2008) and the United States (2001-2006), and as Deputy Foreign Minister of Germany (1998-2001). In 2007, he represented the European Union in the Troika negotiations on the future of Kosovo. In 2014, he served as the Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, promoting national dialogue in the Ukrainian crisis. He is a member of both the Trilateral Commission and the European Council on Foreign Relations, and serves on many non-profit boards, including SIPRI.

Dora Bakoyannis (Greece)

Dora Bakoyannis is a Member of the Greek Parliament. She was Minister of Foreign Affairs (2006-2009) and OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in 2009. Previously, she served as the first female Mayor of Athens (2003-2006) and was appointed Minister for Culture (1992) and Under-Secretary of State (1990). In 2009, Dora Bakoyannis was named as the first female foreign associate of the French Academy of Human and Political Sciences, and as Honorary Senator of the European Academy of Sciences and Art. Prior to her political career, she worked for the Department of European Economic Community Affairs at the Ministry of Economic Coordination.

Tahsin Burcuoğlu (Turkey)

Tahsin Burcuoğlu has a distinguished career in the Turkish foreign service that has included important functions such as policy planner and Ambassador to Bulgaria, Greece and France. He has served as Secretary General of the Turkish National Security Council. He also headed the Turkish National Security Council's Secretariat.

Ivo H. Daalder (United States of America)

Dr. Daalder is the President of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. Before this appointment he served as the Ambassador to the NATO (2009-2013) and a senior fellow in foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution (1998-2009), specializing in American foreign policy, European security and transatlantic relations, and national security affairs. Prior to joining Brookings, he was an Associate Professor at the University of Maryland's School of Public Policy and Director of Research at its Center for International and Security Studies. He also served on the National Security Council staff as Director for European Affairs (1995-1997).

Oleksandr Chalyi (Ukraine)

Ambassador Chalyi is currently the President of Grant Thornton. He served as a Foreign Policy Advisor to the President of Ukraine (2006-2008), State Secretary for European integration issues (2001-2004), and first Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine (1998-2001). He was Ambassador of Ukraine to Romania (1995-1998) and to the Council of Europe (2001), settling urgent issues in Ukrainian foreign policy. Amb. Chalyi has over 35 years of experience in diplomatic and state service, legal and advisory practices. He has received a number of national and international awards.

Vaira Vike-Freiberga (Latvia)

Prof. Vike-Freiberga has served as President of Latvia (1999-2007). She was appointed by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan as Special Envoy on UN reform in 2005. She was Vice Chair of the European Council's Reflection Group on the long term Future of Europe, and she chaired the High-level group on freedom and pluralism of media in the EU in 2011-12. Currently she is President of the Club de Madrid and Co-chair of the Board of Trustees of the Nizami Ganjavi International Centre. Prior to entering politics, she pursued a professorial career at the Department of Psychology of the University of Montreal (1965-1998).

Jean-Marie Guéhenno (France)

Jean-Marie Guéhenno is the President and the CEO of International Crisis Group. He chaired a commission to review the French defense and national security white paper established by President François Hollande. In 2012, he was appointed Deputy Joint Special Envoy of the UN and the Arab League for Syria. He has also served as UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations (2000-2008). As a former French diplomat, he held the position of Chairman of the Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale (1998-2000), served as Director of the French Policy Planning Staff and as Ambassador to the Western European Union.

Barbara Haering (Switzerland)

Dr. Haering is the Director of the private think tank concept Inc. She was a member of the Swiss Parliament from 1990 to 2007. In this capacity, she chaired the Committee on Science, Education and Culture and the Defense Committee, and was Vice-President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. She is Co-Chair of the European Research and Innovation Area Board. She also chairs the Board of the Institute for Advanced Studies in Public Administration in Lausanne and presides over the Foundation Council of the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining.

Sergi Kapanadze (Georgia)

Dr. Kapanadze is the Director of the think tank Georgia's Reforms Associates, Dean of the School of Governance at Caucasus University and Associate Professor of International Relations at the Tbilisi State University. He was Deputy Foreign Minister (2011-2012) and Director of the Department of International Organizations at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia (2008-2011), where he had served in various positions since 2005. In 2006, he was Senior Advisor in the Analytical Group of the Administration of the President of Georgia. He also worked as Policy Analyst at the International Security Department of the National Security Council of Georgia (2004-2005).

Sergey A. Karaganov (Russian Federation)

Prof. Karaganov is Dean of the School of International Economics and Foreign Affairs of the National Research University Higher School of Economics. He is author of numerous publications on economics, foreign policy, arms control, national security strategy, and Russia's foreign and military policy. His previous positions include: Member of the Presidential Council (1993-1998), Adviser to the Deputy Chief of Staff of Presidential Executive Office (2001-2007), Member of the Academic Council of the MFA of Russia (since 1991), and Member of the Academic and Advisory Council, Russian Security Council (since 1993).

Malcolm Rifkind (United Kingdom)

Sir Malcolm Rifkind is a former Member of Parliament (1974-1997, 2005-2015). He served in various roles as a Cabinet Minister under Prime Ministers Margaret Thatcher and John Major, including as Foreign Secretary (1995-1997), Secretary of State for Defence (1992-1995), Secretary of State for Transport (1990-1992), and Secretary of State for Scotland (1986-1990). In 1997 he was knighted in recognition of his public service.

Adam Daniel Rotfeld (Poland)

Prof. Rotfeld currently serves as Professor at Warsaw University. He was Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland (2005) and Secretary of State (2003-2004). He established the Warsaw Reflection Group on the United Nations Reform and the Transformation of the Euro-Atlantic Security Institutions. Previously he served as Director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (1991-2002) and as a project leader on Building a Cooperative Security System in and for Europe at SIPRI (1989-1991). He was Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office to develop the political settlement of the conflict in Transdnistria in 1992. Since 2008 he has been co-chairing the Polish-Russian Group on Difficult Matters.

Teija Tiilikainen (Finland)

Dr. Tiilikainen is the Director of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs. She served as State Secretary at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (2007-2008). She has extensive experience in foreign policy issues, including the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU and the European security policy system. She has held research positions at the University of Turku, Åbo Akademi University, the Finnish National Defence College, and the University of Helsinki. She has published widely.

Kassym-Jomart Tokayev (Kazakhstan)

Dr. Tokayev is currently Chairman of the Senate of the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan. He was Director-General of the UN Office at Geneva, Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the UN to this Conference (2011-2013). He served as Chairman of the Senate of the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan (2007-2011) during which he was elected Vice-President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (2008). He has also served as Secretary of State (2002-2003), Prime Minister of Kazakhstan (1999-2002), and Minister for Foreign Affairs (1994-1999, 2002-2007).

Ivo Visković (Serbia)

Prof. Visković currently serves as Professor at the Faculty of Political Sciences at the University of Belgrade. He was Serbian Ambassador to Germany (2009-2013) and Ambassador of Serbia and Montenegro in Slovenia (2001-2004). In 2007, he became a member of the Council for Foreign Policy of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Chairman of the Forum for International Relations. Prior to this, he lectured at the University of Belgrade in the Faculty of Political Sciences from 1979, where he was the Head of the Department of International Studies (2000-2009).

Panel Meetings

8 February 2015

Munich, Germany

First working session of the Panel

26–27 March 2015

Vienna, Austria

Consultations on the Interim Report

29–30 April 2015

Kiev, Ukraine

Consultations on the Interim Report

5 May 2015

Geneva, Switzerland

Second working session of the Panel

17–18 June 2015

Vienna, Austria

Third working session of the Panel (forthcoming)

2 October 2015

Belgrade, Serbia

Fourth working session of the Panel (forthcoming)

Panel Support

Drafting/editorial Team

Sir Robert Cooper

European Council on Foreign Affairs,
London School of Economics and Political Science

Dr. Walter Kemp

International Peace Institute

Mr. Adrian Oroz

Munich Security Conference Foundation

Research

Dr. Wolfgang Zellner

IFSH Centre for OSCE Research

Vienna-based Support Team/Liaison

Amb. Friedrich Tanner

Senior Adviser to the Secretary General,
OSCE Secretariat

Mr. Juraj Nosál

Project Administrative Assistant, OSCE Secretariat

Ms. Anna Kabanen

Intern, OSCE Secretariat

Munich Security Conference Foundation

Mr. Tim Gürtler

Director for Programs and Operations

Ms. Sara-Sumie Yang

Head of the Chairman's Office

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Panel Mandate

Panel of Eminent Persons on European Security as a Common Project

Purpose and Role of the Panel

The consensus on European security as a common project, as reflected in the Charter of Paris on the basis of the Helsinki Final Act, has gradually eroded over the past years. The implementation of commitments has been uneven and the resulting decrease of trust has weakened several cornerstones of cooperative security. This crisis of European security has been aggravated by the crisis in and around Ukraine. In addition to continuing efforts to restore peace to Ukraine, it is time to start addressing the broader crisis of European security too.

The Panel of Eminent Persons on European Security as a Common Project - hereafter called 'the Panel' - is designed to provide advice on how to (re-)consolidate European security as a common project.

In particular, the Panel will

- ▶ Prepare the basis for an inclusive and constructive security dialogue across the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian regions, taking into consideration the recent crisis in and around Ukraine in its broader perspective as well as other situations in the OSCE area where participating States consider their security to be threatened;
- ▶ Reflect on how to re-build trust to enhance peace and security in Europe on the grounds of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris and on how to ensure effective adherence to the Helsinki Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States;
- ▶ Examine perceived threats in the OSCE area and explore common responses;
- ▶ Explore possibilities to reconfirm, refine, reinvigorate and complement elements of co-operative security;
- ▶ Analyse the particular role of the OSCE in this context, as well as its role in preventing and resolving crises in the OSCE area, including in Ukraine.

Launched in the context of the OSCE Ministerial Council in Basel in December 2014 after consultations with OSCE participating States, the Panel is commissioned by the former Swiss Chairmanship, in close cooperation with the Serbian Chairmanship 2015 and the German Chairmanship 2016.

Membership

The Panel is composed of 15 eminent personalities from all OSCE regions, headed by a Chairperson primus inter pares.

The Panel will gather personalities with long-standing practical expertise in European security in all its dimensions and include policymakers as well as representatives of think tanks.

Members of the Panel serve in their individual capacity.

Outputs

The Panel shall produce two reports:

1. An Interim Report, in particular on lessons learned for the OSCE from its engagement in Ukraine.
2. A Final Report on the broader issues of security in Europe and the OSCE area at large, as outlined above.

Both reports should contain recommendations on action points for policy makers, including for the OSCE Ministerial Council and participating States.

Working Methods

General guidance will be provided by the OSCE Troika 2015.

The Panel will seek input from participating States, the OSCE Institutions, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, multilateral actors concerned with European security issues, civil society, think tanks, and other relevant actors through hearings, commissioning of papers, and other forms of activities.

The Panel and individual members will be provided opportunities to engage with high-level representatives of participating States (for example in the form of side events at multilateral conferences and other international events).

The Panel will be assisted by a support unit which will provide operational and logistical support in convening meetings as well as substantive support in drafting the reports. The OSCE Secretariat will provide additional operational and logistical support, as needed. The OSCE network of think tanks and academic institutions should be engaged as a contributor for research- and input-papers.

The Panel will address in parallel the different issues outlined above, irrespective of the more specific focus of the Interim Report.

Timeframe

- ▶ Presentation of the Panel and constitutive meeting (January/February 2015)
- ▶ Interim Report (June 2015)
- ▶ Final Report (November/December 2015): presentation at the Ministerial Council in Belgrade
- ▶ Follow-up (2016)
- ▶ Further outreach events at multilateral conferences;
- ▶ Presentation of the report at, inter alia, WEF, Munich Security Conference, in the margins of UNGA;
- ▶ Discussion of the report in the appropriate OSCE fora.

Financing

The Panel will be financed through voluntary contributions.

The Panel of Eminent Persons on European Security as a Common Project was launched at the OSCE Ministerial Council in Basel in December 2014. It was commissioned by the Swiss Chairmanship 2014, in close co-operation with the 2015 OSCE Troika (Serbia, Switzerland and Germany). The Panel consists of 15 eminent personalities with long-standing practical expertise in European security in all its dimensions from all OSCE regions. It has been tasked to prepare the basis for an inclusive and constructive security dialogue across the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian regions, and to reflect on how to re-build trust to enhance peace and security in the OSCE area on the grounds of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris. In this context, the Panel shall produce two reports: an Interim Report on lessons learned for the OSCE from its engagement in Ukraine, and a Final Report on the broader issues of security in Europe and the OSCE area at large.